Rethinking the concept of existential freedom in the thought of Mulla Sadra and Heidegger: From the originality of existence to freedom from determinations

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 Amirkabir University

2 amir kabir university

10.22081/jti.2026.73581.1114

Abstract

The concept of “freedom” is one of the most fundamental issues in the philosophy of existence, which has found a special place in two different intellectual traditions – Mulla Sadra’s transcendental wisdom and Heidegger’s ontological philosophy. In Mulla Sadra’s thought, freedom is not a political or social concept, but rather an existential behavior that finds meaning in the light of “substantial movement” and “the formation of being”; that is, the more perfect the level of human existence becomes, the more freed from the determinations of matter and soul and closer to the realm of reason and spirit. In contrast, Heidegger considers freedom not to be an internal or voluntary matter, but rather a way of being that a human being experiences in relation to the “truth of being.” The present article, using an analytical-comparative method, reconsiders the relationship between the "authenticity of existence" in Sadr'i philosophy and "authentic freedom" in Heidegger's philosophy, and shows that both thinkers, despite their differences in conceptual systems, have considered freedom to mean liberation from the "fall to the level of beings" and a return to the truth of existence. This new interpretation can provide a model for dialogue between Islamic philosophy and contemporary Western philosophy.

Keywords