Critical Examination of the Cognitive-Analytic ‎Approach to Moral Self-Deception

Document Type : Original Article

Author

Assistant Professor, Department of Ethics, Research Institute of Philosophy and Theology, Islamic Sciences and ‎Culture Academy, Qom, Iran.‎

Abstract

The problem of moral self-deception has always been one of the complex puzzles in the philosophy of mind and ethics due to its entanglement with epistemic paradoxes—a phenomenon that seemingly requires the simultaneous acceptance of two incompatible cognitive states, meaning that the agent believes in a proposition while possessing strong evidence to the contrary. Focusing on the cognitive-analytic approach, this article demonstrates that within this framework, the problem transcends mere explanation of neurobiological mechanisms and centers on evaluating the logical possibility of self-deception and the endeavor to escape static and dynamic paradoxes. In the first step, while distinguishing self-deception from similar phenomena such as wishful thinking, the current research emphasizes the central role of motivational components in the formation of beliefs contrary to evidence. In the main section, two prominent models of this approach—the Canfield-Gustafson linguistic model and the Jeffrey Foss epistemological model—are formulated and critiqued. Examinations show that the former, despite attempting to dissolve the paradox through the dissection of ordinary language, falls into reductionism and reduces the phenomenon merely to a belief contrary to evidence. Furthermore, by applying thought experiments such as the swimmers' scenario, it is argued that the evidence-based criterion of Foss also leads to unreasonable and counter-intuitive epistemic consequences. The final conclusion of the article indicates that the cognitive-analytic approach, despite its conceptual precision and logical sensitivity, faces inherent limitations in providing a comprehensive explanation of moral self-deception; because resolving the paradox solely at the cognitive level, while neglecting the normative and phenomenological layers of the agent’s moral experience, leads to overlooking the fundamental dimensions of self-deception.

Keywords

References

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Theosophia Islamica
Volume 6, Issue 1 - Serial Number 11
January 2026
Pages 153-186

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