The issue of moral self-deception has always been one of the most intricate puzzles in the philosophy of mind and ethics, due to its entanglement with epistemic paradoxes—a phenomenon that apparently requires the simultaneous acceptance of two incompatible cognitive states. In other words, the agent believes a proposition while possessing strong evidence to the contrary.
Focusing on a cognitive–analytical approach, this article argues that, within this framework, the problem goes beyond a mere explanation of neurocognitive mechanisms,Focusing on a cognitive–analytical approach, this article argues that, within this framework, the problem goes beyond a mere explanation of neurocognitive mechanisms, emphasizing instead the logical possibility of self-deception and the attempt to resolve both static and dynamic paradoxes.
In the first step, while distinguishing self-deception from similar phenomena such as wishful thinking, the study highlights the central role of motivational components in the formation of beliefs that conflict with available evidence. In the
Danesh, J. (2026). “A Review and Critique of the Cognitive–Analytical Approach to Moral Self-Deception”. Theosophia Islamica, (), -. doi: 10.22081/jti.2026.74406.1117
MLA
Danesh, J. . "“A Review and Critique of the Cognitive–Analytical Approach to Moral Self-Deception”", Theosophia Islamica, , , 2026, -. doi: 10.22081/jti.2026.74406.1117
HARVARD
Danesh, J. (2026). '“A Review and Critique of the Cognitive–Analytical Approach to Moral Self-Deception”', Theosophia Islamica, (), pp. -. doi: 10.22081/jti.2026.74406.1117
CHICAGO
J. Danesh, "“A Review and Critique of the Cognitive–Analytical Approach to Moral Self-Deception”," Theosophia Islamica, (2026): -, doi: 10.22081/jti.2026.74406.1117
VANCOUVER
Danesh, J. “A Review and Critique of the Cognitive–Analytical Approach to Moral Self-Deception”. Theosophia Islamica, 2026; (): -. doi: 10.22081/jti.2026.74406.1117
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