Epistemic Evidentialism in al-Fārābī’s Thought

Al-Fārābī, as a philosopher who distinctively synthesized the Aristotelian tradition with elements of Neoplatonism and Platonism in the Islamic world, preserved a substantial portion of Aristotelian epistemology within his own intellectual system. Just as Aristotle is widely regarded in contemporary epistemology as largely an evidentialist, so too is al-Fārābī. However, in Iran, many — especially certain proponents of Illuminationist and Sadrian traditions — have sought to discover some form of intuitionism, or at least evidence contrary to evidentialism, within al-Fārābī’s thought. This judgment, however, stands in contrast to the position of notable scholars of Islamic philosophy, such as Dimitri Gutas. The issue is of considerable significance, as the epistemological shift in Islamic philosophy from evidentialism toward other tendencies played a crucial role in altering the very nature of the tradition. Accordingly, this article seeks to demonstrate, on the basis of available textual and philosophical evidence, that al-Fārābī was fundamentally an evidentialist, heavily indebted in this respect to Aristotle. It also critically examines the purported evidence against this interpretation. Given that “evidentialism” is a term rooted in contemporary Western epistemology, this study approaches al-Fārābī’s philosophy through the lens of this philosophical framework. Furthermore, the analysis primarily engages with the interpretations of Western scholars of Islamic philosophy, whose language and conceptual apparatus are closely aligned with contemporary epistemological discourse.

Al-Fārābī, as a philosopher who distinctively synthesized the Aristotelian tradition with elements of Neoplatonism and Platonism in the Islamic world, preserved a substantial portion of Aristotelian epistemology within his own intellectual system. Just as Aristotle is widely regarded in contemporary epistemology as largely an evidentialist, so too is al-Fārābī. However, in Iran, many — especially certain proponents of Illuminationist and Sadrian traditions — have sought to discover some form of intuitionism, or at least evidence contrary to evidentialism, within al-Fārābī’s thought. This judgment, however, stands in contrast to the position of notable scholars of Islamic philosophy, such as Dimitri Gutas. The issue is of considerable significance, as the epistemological shift in Islamic philosophy from evidentialism toward other tendencies played a crucial role in altering the very nature of the tradition. Accordingly, this article seeks to demonstrate, on the basis of available textual and philosophical evidence, that al-Fārābī was fundamentally an evidentialist, heavily indebted in this respect to Aristotle. It also critically examines the purported evidence against this interpretation. Given that “evidentialism” is a term rooted in contemporary Western epistemology, this study approaches al-Fārābī’s philosophy through the lens of this philosophical framework. Furthermore, the analysis primarily engages with the interpretations of Western scholars of Islamic philosophy, whose language and conceptual apparatus are closely aligned with contemporary epistemological discourse.

Al-Fārābī, as a philosopher who distinctively synthesized the Aristotelian tradition with elements of Neoplatonism and Platonism in the Islamic world, preserved a substantial portion of Aristotelian epistemology within his own intellectual system. Just as Aristotle is widely regarded in contemporary epistemology as largely an evidentialist, so too is al-Fārābī. However, in Iran, many — especially certain proponents of Illuminationist and Sadrian traditions — have sought to discover some form of intuitionism, or at least evidence contrary to evidentialism, within al-Fārābī’s thought. This judgment, however, stands in contrast to the position of notable scholars of Islamic philosophy, such as Dimitri Gutas. The issue is of considerable significance, as the epistemological shift in Islamic philosophy from evidentialism toward other tendencies played a crucial role in altering the very nature of the tradition. Accordingly, this article seeks to demonstrate, on the basis of available textual and philosophical evidence, that al-Fārābī was fundamentally an evidentialist, heavily indebted in this respect to Aristotle. It also critically examines the purported evidence against this interpretation. Given that “evidentialism” is a term rooted in contemporary Western epistemology, this study approaches al-Fārābī’s philosophy through the lens of this philosophical framework. Furthermore, the analysis primarily engages with the interpretations of Western scholars of Islamic philosophy, whose language and conceptual apparatus are closely aligned with contemporary epistemological discourse.Al-Fārābī, as a philosopher who distinctively synthesized the Aristotelian tradition with elements of Neoplatonism and Platonism in the Islamic world, preserved a substantial portion of Aristotelian epistemology within his own intellectual system. Just as Aristotle is widely regarded in contemporary epistemology as largely an evidentialist, so too is al-Fārābī. However, in Iran, many — especially certain proponents of Illuminationist and Sadrian traditions — have sought to discover some form of intuitionism, or at least evidence contrary to evidentialism, within al-Fārābī’s thought. This judgment, however, stands in contrast to the position of notable scholars of Islamic philosophy, such as Dimitri Gutas. The issue is of considerable significance, as the epistemological shift in Islamic philosophy from evidentialism toward other tendencies played a crucial role in altering the very nature of the tradition. Accordingly, this article seeks to demonstrate, on the basis of available textual and philosophical evidence, that al-Fārābī was fundamentally an evidentialist, heavily indebted in this respect to Aristotle. It also critically examines the purported evidence against this interpretation. Given that “evidentialism” is a term rooted in contemporary Western epistemology, this study approaches al-Fārābī’s philosophy through the lens of this philosophical framework. Furthermore, the analysis primarily engages with the interpretations of Western scholars of Islamic philosophy, whose language and conceptual apparatus are closely aligned with contemporary epistemological discourse.