The Soul and Sensory Perception in Aristotle, Avicenna, and Mulla Sadra: Emphasizing Mulla Sadra's Theoretical Rupture

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Document Type : Original Article

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استادیار گروه فلسفه دانشگاه کردستان

10.22081/jti.2025.72119.1083

Abstract

This article employs a descriptive-analytical method to articulate Mulla Sadra's epistemological rupture in the theory of the soul from the Peripatetic philosophers. We will begin by critically examining the theories of the soul and sensory perception as held by Aristotle and Avicenna (Ibn Sina), subsequently delving into Mulla Sadra's intellectual leap in this domain. We will demonstrate how a transformation in the theory of the soul simultaneously brings about a revolution in the theory of knowledge concerning the external world.In general, regarding discussions on perceptions and knowledge, Mulla Sadra (Sadr al-Muta'allihin) refutes all preceding theories, including: The critique of knowledge being quidditative and the correspondence theory of knowledge with the known. The critique of knowledge being a psychic quality. The critique of the theory of abstracting the form of the external object in the mind. The critique of knowledge being a mental form. The critique of knowledge being an accident or relation. One of the significant outcomes of Mulla Sadra's unique theory of the soul is the soul's power to actualize and originate mental forms. From his perspective, the soul is the agent and creator of sensory and imaginal forms. Therefore, it must be stated that, from this viewpoint, the relationship between forms and the soul is the relationship of an act to its agent, not the relationship of acceptance to a recipient. As Mulla Sadra would argue, just as God emanates His creations, we too emanate our knowledge in the form of mental images from within ourselves.

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Theosophia Islamica

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript
Available Online from 30 June 2025

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