فلسفه و حکمت اسلامی، علوم و تحقیقات اسلامی، دانشگاه بین المللی امام خمینی، ایران، قزوین
10.22081/jti.2025.71739.1072
Abstract
Abstract
The mind-body problem remains one of the most fundamental and perplexing issues in the philosophy of mind, addressing the relationship between mental states and neural processes. John Searle, a contemporary American philosopher, offers a distinctive solution through his theory of Biological Naturalism. According to Searle, mental phenomena such as consciousness are both caused by and realized in the biological processes of the brain. He distinguishes between causal reducibility and ontological irreducibility of consciousness, aiming to propose a middle ground between reductive physicalism and traditional dualism. Central to his theory are concepts such as intentionality, mental causation, and emergent properties, which serve to explain how subjective experience fits into the natural world. However, Searle’s approach has faced substantial criticism from philosophers such as Daniel Dennett, Thomas Nagel, and David Chalmers, some of whom interpret his theory as a reformulated version of property dualism. This article offers a critical analysis of Searle’s biological naturalism, evaluating both its philosophical coherence and its explanatory power regarding the mind-body problem. Ultimately, the paper aims to clarify the strengths and limitations of Searle’s view in comparison with competing theories and to assess whether his approach genuinely resolves the core tensions inherent in the mind-body debate.
)