Critical Review of ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi’s ‎View of Intentionality

Esfandiar, Hossein; Najafi, Zahra

doi:10.22081/jti.2025.69676.1054

Critical Review of ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi’s ‎View of Intentionality

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

Hossein Esfandiar ¹
Zahra Najafi ²

¹ Ph.D. in Islamic Philosophy, Visiting Professor in University of Religions and ‎Denominations, Qom, Iran.‎

² Level 3 student of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Al-Zahra Community, Qom, Iran.

10.22081/jti.2025.69676.1054

Abstract

Intentionality, as a fundamental concept in the philosophy of mind, is essential to understanding how mental states are directed toward objects, concepts, or states of affairs. This article examines the theory of intentionality presented by ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi, with a focus on his Islamic philosophical framework. The research begins by defining the problem of intentionality, which concerns the nature, possibility, and content determination of mental states. We highlight how Tabatabaʾi’s grounding of intentionality in mental existence and immaterial knowledge provides a distinct perspective compared to contemporary naturalistic approaches. The study employs a qualitative, analytical, and comparative methodology, examining primary texts from Islamic philosophy, including works by Avicenna, Mullā Ṣadrā, and ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi, alongside modern Western discussions on intentionality. Through this critical lens, we identify Tabatabaʾi’s key contributions: the essential revelatory character of knowledge, the abstraction process in content determination, and the inseparable connection between mental existence and intentionality. The research findings reveal that while Tabatabaʾi’s model offers a metaphysically robust explanation of intentionality, it encounters significant challenges when evaluated in the context of contemporary cognitive science. Critiques include the lack of empirical testability, potential conceptual ambiguity for modern scholars unfamiliar with Islamic metaphysics, and the absence of a clear mechanistic explanation that aligns with materialist paradigms. Nevertheless, the article underscores the innovative nature of Tabatabaʾi’s approach in bridging classical Islamic thought with modern philosophical discourse. It also suggests potential interdisciplinary dialogues, especially with phenomenological perspectives that similarly emphasize the inherent directedness of consciousness. The findings contribute to a broader understanding of intentionality and open new avenues for future research on the integration of metaphysical and empirical frameworks in the philosophy of mind.

Keywords

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