In Defense of Integrative Dualism; Placing values at the heart ofPhilosophy of Mind

"Substance dualism" or the thesis that a person is an embodied nonphysical being (mind or soul) is systematically caricatured in philosophy of mind literature as involving an untenable bifurcation. Instead of such a splintered, divided concept of the person, I defend integrative dualism, the thesis that while a person is a nonphysical subject (and thus a being that can survive the death of the body), in this life he or she functions as a united, embodied being. Embodiment consists of six nonmoral goods (they are good but not as in "moral goods" such as justice and courage): the virtues of sensations, agency, causal constitution, cognitive power, intelligible coherence, and affective incorporation. This united concept of an embodied person places values at the heart of the philosophy of human nature. This value-oriented concept of embodiment can be a rich, common resource for Christian-Muslim dialogue. This value-oriented concept of embodiment can be a rich, common resource for Christian-Muslim dialogue.