Infanticide and the Question of Personhood: A ‎Critique of the View of Alberto Giubilini and ‎Francesca Minerva

Articles in Press

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 PhD. student, Department of Philosophy and Theology (Imami Kalam), Faculty of Islamic Studies, ‎University of Quran and Hadith, Qom, Iran (Responsible author).‎

2 ‎. Assistant professor, Department of Moral Philosophy, Islamic Philosophy and ‎Theology, Research Center, Qom, Iran.‎

10.22081/jti.2026.74814.1131

Abstract

Infanticide is a fundamental issue in bioethics and the philosophy of law, one that depends on how “personhood” is defined and on the basis upon which the “right to life” is recognized. The importance of this issue lies in the fact that any redefinition of the concept of personhood may alter the scope of the right to life and the moral and legal protection granted to human beings. This article aims to examine and criticize the view of Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva regarding the permissibility of infanticide. By distinguishing between a “biological human being” and a “moral person,” they argue that newborn infants, like fetuses, lack the characteristics necessary for personhood because they are neither capable of valuing their own existence nor capable of being harmed by being deprived of that existence. They therefore maintain that the reasons used to justify abortion may also be applied to newborn infants. Using an analytical-critical method, the present study examines the philosophical foundations and ethical consequences of this theory and analyzes the arguments for and against it. The findings indicate that the criterion of an “actual person” leads to the denial of the right to life to certain human beings, including infants and individuals with severe intellectual disabilities, and makes human dignity dependent on temporary mental capacities. Moreover, restricting the concept of harm to its conscious experience encounters serious logical and ethical objections. The study concludes that Giubilini and Minerva’s theory lacks sufficient coherence and cannot preserve the connection among equality, dignity, and the right to life. Recognizing the right to life on the basis of intrinsic dignity and membership in humanity therefore provides a more reasonable framework for addressing the issue of infanticide.

Keywords

References

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Available Online from 17 June 2026

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