The Analysis and Critique of Cognitive Rationality from Rescher’s Viewpoint

Document Type : Original Article


1 Associate Professor in Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology, Qom University, Qom, Iran

2 Graduate in Comparative Philosophy, Qom University, Qom, Iran


In Rescher’s view, the cognitive rationality is using dialectic arguments for managing the acceptance of various beliefs and answering the individual’s questions in the best way – an approach that can entail access to rational propositions and true knowledge. While believing in the limitation of rational faculties, Rescher maintains that the intelligence endowed in human being in an evolutional way prepares the ground for his access to the authentic knowledge. The cognitive importance of the criterion of investigating the value of knowledge suggests the existence of an effective factor that can help us in qualitative and quantitative promotion of and deepening our essential information. Skepticism rejects the possibility of accessing authentic information and puts a seemingly strong obstacle on the way to implementing and realizing the goals of argument, and maintains that cognitive rationality is never possible. Rescher considers justification of skepticism based on the wrong assumption that the rational justification of a belief is restricted to the deductive reasoning founded on pre-justified propositions. However, in addition to this, we have the method of hypothetical justification that skeptics ignore.


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