



The Lingual Structure of Reality Critical Investigation of Ricard Rorty's View

Isa Musazada¹

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Abstract

The contemporary world observes an increasing leaning from the thinkers in various intellectual and cultural spheres towards an approach to reality, interpreting reality as something in relationship to human beings and his goals and purposes, not independent of them. Richard Rorty is among the adherents of such a thought. The present article uses an analytical-critical method to show how Rorty has defended this view and to evaluate his view. According to the present study, it is clarified that Rorty adduces the features he considers for language to negate the possibility of accessing pure and naked reality; thus, he considers the available reality as made by ourselves in cooperation with others, which has a quite lingual structure. In my view, however, despite the fact that believing in lingual structure of reality places us in a better situation for defending concepts such as activity, freedom, self-consciousness, ownership, thinking and genuine life, Rorty's emphasis on solidarity,

1. Researcher in Academy of Philosophy and Theology, Research Center of Islamic Sciences and Culture, Qom, Iran. mousazadeh@isca.ac.ir

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instead of objectivity and truth, entails a dominion of culture over the rational sciences. Consequently, we observe a leaning towards the principality of 'will' (including both individual and social) according to which, philosophy turns into something *a posteriori* and relied on will.

Keywords

Richard Rorty, language, objectivity, solidarity, lingual reality, activity, self-consciousness, freedom.

Introduction

The concept of reality, like many other concepts, have undergone basic changes throughout the history of thought. The initial impression of reality regards it as an idea independent of consciousness and subject, considering the intellectual achievements of the subject as the basis of truth. But the deficiencies of this view were revealed soon and, to offer a proper answer to critics, some thinkers distinguished 'phenomenal reality' from the 'reality *itself*'. There were disagreements among these individuals on what the role of the reality *itself* is and what its relation to the reality for us is. They also disagreed on whether the reality for us (the phenomenal reality) is a personal affair or a public one and issues like these. Finally, the absolute idealism denied the reality outside consciousness. Regarding the relationship between the language and reality, we observe a similar trend. That is, most thinkers consider language and reality as two completely separate categories. Accordingly, the language depicts reality, and it is passive in this depiction. According to this approach, reality – which is quite independent of the subject – is the foundation of truth and verity of lingual descriptions. The later Wittgenstein reversed that approach with a revolutionary motion (like Kant's Copernican revolution), and regarded language as the basis for the reality emergent before us. In this way, in proportion to the new look at the subject as an active agent, not a passive one, in the process of identification, and with the lingual turn occurred in the twentieth century, the reality found a lingual tint and the lingual attitude towards reality was formed. In the meantime, Richard Rorty's view of reality, with its lingual turn, is a quite linguistic view.¹

1. For more study about Rorty's view of reality and its lingual structure, see: Musazada, 'I, Asghari, M. and Abdullah-nejad, M. R. (1400 SH). "The Lingual Structure of Reality in Richard Rorty's Thought" in the Scientific-Research Periodical of *Pazhuhishhāyi Falsafī Kalāmī*, 23(90), pp. 103-120.

The present article seeks to offer an analytical-critical description of the lingual structure of reality in Rorty's thought and evaluate it critically.

1. Features of Language

Rorty enumerates features for language that are the foundations of his view regarding 'reality' and its relationship with language. These features are as follows:

1-1. The Instrumental Nature of Language

Darwin believed that the mutations and evolutions occurring in a living organism are quite contingent and pursue no predetermined goal. He, then, says that among the changes, those that heighten the living organism's ability for adopting itself with the environment and, in a sense, increase its possibility for survival are supported, preserved and, indeed, selected by the environment. Darwin's description of evolution has some important and considerable points that have influenced Rorty's description of language. Among them is instrumental look at the capabilities and facilities of the living organism.

The instrument or tool is, basically, for performing tasks and achieving goals, whose nature is constituted of 'being for a goal'; thus, in Rorty's view, language is neither essential in human nor does it have an essence. Language and vocabulary are tools like other tools emerged in the process of gradual evolution and precisely it is always possible that the environmental changes reduce its efficiency. Thus, for preserving better consistency with the new environment and ecology, they are always in need of changes and subject to them (Rorty, 1991a, p. 127). According to such a biological perception of language, the origin and nature of language finds a completely natural explanation,

not an abstract and metaphysical one. That is, the origination of language is related to the empirical and cause-effect condition, with no *a priori* and transcendental condition.

1-2. Impossibility of Going Beyond Language

Instrumental look at language has implications, and Rorty tries to be committed to them. Impossibility of going beyond language is – indeed – one of these implications. Rorty believes that for the beings with language, there is no possibility to exit the language and lingual descriptions; and this, indeed, means that we are imprisoned by our language and our altering and historical descriptions (Rorty, 1990, pp. 96-98). There is no way out of language to achieve the naked reality, whether this reality is of the genus of intellect and intelligible things or of senses and sensible things. Even in regard with statements that apparently describe our internal states (such as I'm hungry, I have pain, etc.), he maintains that they have no function other than helping us in harmonizing and adapting ourselves with others (and the environment). He adduces the beliefs of Wittgenstein and Davidson and says that language is by no means seeking to establish a relationship with non-linguistic reality. Even having a mind means having the ability to harmonize oneself with the environment, not an internal theater (Rorty, 2003).

In this way, he negates any kind of referring the language to reality, including internal and external ones. Thus, there can be no Archimedean and absolute perspective. Therefore, we cannot go out of language to speak about its conformity or non-conformity to reality; nor is there some general and rational principles to be a basis for justifying and using a series of words instead of another series. However, this does not mean that there is no justification for using a series of words and not using another series. In fact, considering the

instrumental look at language and that words do not represent the universe and a reality independent of language, justification of using words is possible in relation to the goal for which they have been created, just as the justification of any tool is always in relation to a certain goal. Efficacy and justification of any description of the universe is evaluable in relation to the goals, purposes and benefits of that description. Thus, evaluation of various descriptions of universe can occur on the basis of fulfilling their purposes and benefits (Nowzari, 1380 SH, p. 27). Accordingly, justifying the usage of the words has nothing to do with establishing a certain relationship between the words and the objects; rather, it is something dependent on the goals and benefits emerged and evaluated in the social and historical contexts. Therefore, the justification of the use of a certain word is something quite social, for firstly justification of the use of a word is justifying it for others and the society; and secondly, justification of using a certain word is dependent on the purposes and benefits in using it and, indeed, the role that the word can play. And since the meaning and role of the words are in their usage, and the usage of a word can occur in the context of social interactions and in the historical and cultural context, justification is – in this sense – something quite social not individual. That is, the question is whether using such a vocabulary is acceptable for others who form the members of the same society or not.

1-3. The Social, Metaphoric, Contingent and Possible Nature of the Language

In Rorty's thought, language is an instrument for improving and facilitating the group and social activities of individuals to the extent that even the individuals' description of the nature and of themselves is also dependent on their needs. Thus, due to the

instrumental feature of the language, we observe the possible feature in language. We infer two points from this. First, language lacks a fixed nature; and second, reality is constructed by language. Lack of a fixed nature for language is another statement of the possible and contingent nature of language, which leads – consequently – to contingent nature of cultural procedures. The result of such a reciprocity in contingent nature of language and cultural procedures is the lack of universal vocabulary. That is, any society will have its own special vocabulary and, so to speak, there is no Archimedean point for evaluating and scoring about the vocabulary used by various societies (Rorty, 1991a, p. 12). And the reality that we speak in one style and not the other are determined by historical events that could be in another form (Brandom, 2000, p. 35). Indeed, in Rorty's view, the ultimate vocabulary is different from one society to another and, thus, we cannot present an always fixed description of reality in general through language. He says:

All human beings carry about a set of words which they employ to justify their actions, their beliefs, and their lives. These are the words in which we formulate praise of our friends and contempt for our enemies, our long-term projects, our deepest self-doubts and our highest hopes. I shall call these words a person's "final vocabulary". (Rorty, 1998, p. 73)

Rorty's metaphoric look at language also reinforces the theory of contingency and possibility of language. He maintains that metaphors merely have literal meanings. They stimulate our thought and our insight of the universe, but they never depict the universe. Thus, the metaphors lead us to new looks and – therefore – new forms of living. For Rorty, such a metaphoric view about language places us in the situation of perceiving the contingent and possible nature of language (see: Asghari, 1394 SH, p. 10). He considers scientific changes and

revolutions as metaphoric re-descriptions of nature and us, not efforts for discovering the innate character hidden in them. Such a look at language and vocabulary can, indeed, be considered as the product of regarding language and vocabulary and, consequently, the cultural procedures as altering phenomena (Rorty, 1385 SH, pp. 41-42). Thus, this metaphoric view of language challenges the idea of mediatory and representative nature of language.

2. Structural Nature of Reality

Naturalists would assume, for long, that there is a reality independent of language, and that the task of language is describing it. A naturalist considers the universe as having a fixed and perpetual essence, with the possibility of direct encounter with it and knowing it through that encounter independent of language; and thus, the truth and verity are also in conformity of language with a reality existing there independent of it. Rorty says that the naturalist image of the relationship between language and the universe leads him back to the claim that the universe is independent of recognizable languages... This primary encounter is the encounter with the universe itself, the world that inherently exists (1990, p. 109). In other words, the naturalists believe that some sciences lead us beyond language and our needs to something absolute, non-relative, and tremendously non-human. Matters such as objective reality, thing-in-itself and God are examples of such affairs out of ourselves, our language, and our purposes and our needs, to whom numerous thinkers have resorted in various historical eras.

However, Rorty neither accepts the duality of language and reality, nor does he accept that the language is a barrier between the mind and the reality, because the language is the inseparable element of our experience of the universe and there is no distinction between

knowing things and using them. Thus, the claim to know something does not mean, in principle, that we are able to do it or ascribe it to something else (Rorty, 1990, pp. 98-99). Accordingly, the truth (verity) is also dependent on the language created by the human for certain purposes and goals and cannot be out of language. This is because firstly, just our description of the universe have the possibility of verity or falsity. Secondly, descriptions are able to be formulated just in the form of sentences. Thirdly, sentences are constituent elements of language, and language has been created by human.

Now, when we put two aspects of Rorty's thought beside one another, it becomes clear how, in Rorty's view, reality for us is something that we ourselves make in cooperation with one another. Those two aspects are as follows: firstly, reality is never accessible for us in a naked form and we always face our own description of reality, not the reality independent of our language and our needs. Secondly, the language has an instrumental, poetic and metaphoric nature.

In regard with the fact that we always face our own description of reality, not the reality independent of the language and our needs, it must be said that, in Rorty's view, the main function of lingual behavior and the signs and voices one produces is to harmonize his actions with the environment and with others, and preparing the possibility for predicting his future behavior for others. Thus, the language is formed in a certain relationship with the environment, not in vacuum. In other words, the function and purpose of sentences that apparently are descriptions and output of states such as hunger and the like is not externalizing what is internal. Rather, indeed, it is helping the environment in predicting the actions and harmonizing our behavior with it (Rorty, 1990, pp. 28-29). In fact, word are nodes in the causal network between the human and the environment that link him to his ecology, not representations that are inside the mind. This is

because the tools are a part of the process of the living organisms' interaction with the environment wherein they breathe and, as mentioned before, languages are very efficient and useful tools for interacting and working with things in the environment. Thus, human's encounter with reality does not occur in vacuum; rather, it occurs in relationship with human's purposes and needs; and here, language plays the role of an efficient tool used in the basis of usefulness and in line with achieving the purposes and needs of a being that has language. Human's encounter with the reality is a lingual encounter, because – in principle – the human cannot go beyond the language. For us (the creatures with language), there is no possibility to exit the language and the lingual descriptions (Rorty, 1990. P. 97). And this – indeed – means that we are imprisoned by the language and the altering and historical descriptions.

When, on the one hand, the vocabulary has a basically instrumental nature and the relationship between the instrument with what is used is a useful relationship and, on the other hand, our only knowledge of something is considering its relationship with other things, it is quite natural that exiting the language and its descriptions and naked observation and perception of reality is impossible. Thus, "Never can we step out of the language and we will not be able to achieve the reality without intermediacy of lingual descriptions." (Rorty, 1990, p. 97). Rorty's main idea in this regard is that human's encounter with reality is a lingual encounter and, thus, reality never comes to our access in the naked form; and the universe cannot exist for us without our descriptions of it.

As to the fact that language has an instrumental, poetic and metaphoric nature, we must say that although the realistic function of language is under question, its poetic and metaphoric structure has been emphasized. Unlike the traditional philosophies, who have

ignored the poetic structure of language, perceiving its metaphoric aspect as a negative one, the metaphoric and poetic aspects of language have a very important and interesting role and function for the contemporary thinkers, in a way that today the usage of metaphor is not restricted to poetry and literature any longer. Rather, it represents many discourses created – including science, art, morality, and politics – and even sometimes in science, morality and art, we observe sentences that are traditionally false, and are – despite their false form – very illuminative and useful and, thus, many thinkers – including Rorty – believe that metaphor and poetic form are basic elements of progress in all scientific and cultural grounds. He believes that metaphors, while having no meaning except the literal meaning, have some important functions in the language. In relation to beliefs, they have a causal role and, thus, play a very strong role in the creation and redefinition of our beliefs, our descriptions and even our needs (Rorty, 1991b, p. 124). The causes of belief, unlike its reasons that have an epistemological role, play just an ontological role. Thus, despite the fact that metaphors are very efficient and useful tools for presence and activity in the environment and with others, they lack the cognitive aspect. He says when a metaphor is created, it does not speak of or show what is already existent, although such a metaphor is caused by what is already existent (Rorty, 1998, p. 36). We see that for Rorty, metaphor, just like the language itself, has an instrumental aspect and is useful for acting in the environment and with others as well as achieving our goals, not for representing reality.

Therefore, considering the fact that, on the one hand, it is not possible to go beyond language, encountering with reality is a lingual encounter and it is not possible to access the naked reality, and the language has an instrumental , poetic and metaphoric structure on the other hand, we can conclude that the language and vocabulary do not

represent the universe and reality; rather, they are – indeed – creators and innovators of reality (Rorty, 1990, p. 10). The language has a poetic structure that creates the universe; it does not reflect it; and thus, there is no truth without presupposition and impartiality far from its historical possibilities and probabilities. The language just equips us with a description of the universe that is essentially historical and possible. The language constructs the universe, not represents it.

Of course, as we mentioned before, when we say we will not see the reality clear, vivid and naked before our eyes and, thus, the idea of having access to the reality itself independent of any special style of description is not understandable does not mean that we construct the reality arbitrarily in any way we want. This is because, while emphasizing that there is no way for encountering the reality except through the language and its descriptions, Rorty believes that there are things with their causal effects in the outside world and our lingual descriptions – which are under the influence of lingual community and the history influencing the describer – are ultimately related to these causal effects. This is while these effects are understandable and recognizable in the level of language, not independent of it. However, it removes the doubt of the arbitrariness of the human constructs.

Rorty believes that the prominent feature of objectivism and, in a sense, we can say the foundation of distinctions such as mind and object or language and reality, is focusing on searching for truth, the truth that is as something that must be searched for itself, not as something good for the person and the real community. In his view, the object that is independent of human and his needs is – somehow – the inevitable result of the belief that the only way for meaningfulness of our life is in having relationship with a meta-human truth that one can access in a way independent of the link with others and

participating in the society. What objectivity wants is – indeed – an attempt for establishing relations with a non-human affair and moving to an already prepared place outside the universe and human community. The heritage of the objectivist thought – formed on the axis of searching for truth – are terms such as ‘God’, ‘intellect’ and ‘nature’ as well as going away from concepts such as solidarity, agreement and humans’ consensus in the society. However, unlike leaning towards objectivity – which is a type of leaning towards non-human reality – proclivity to solidarity is a type of leaning to relationship with members of society and other individuals and, thus, it is good to substitute the concept of ‘non-imposed agreement’ for the less useful concept of objectivity (Rorty, 1991b, p. 154). Solidarity is not a non-historical reality discovered by the thinkers throughout history. Rather, it has been constructed by the human community throughout history (Rorty, 1998, p. 19). Such a feature (constructed nature of solidarity) is in relation to the historical, time and place features of solidarity. By reinterpreting objectivity into solidarity, the objectivity is indeed reduced into inter-mentality. Thus, the questions such as ‘how can one establish relationship with a reality independent from mind and language’ will be avoided and, instead, the emphasis will be put on questions such as ‘what are the limitations of our community?’ and ‘Are our encounters sufficiently free and open?’ (Rorty, 1991b, p. 13).

3. Evaluation of Rorty's View

We noted that Rorty considers features for language that overshadow the whole of his thought. Firstly. He considers the language as having an instrumental feature and, thus, lacking a fixed nature and identity. Secondly, he maintains that going beyond the language is not possible and, thus, the limits of our world is the same as the limits of our language and vice versa. Thirdly, the language has a metaphoric,

poetic and contingent feature. As an example, according to the fact that there is no possibility for exiting the language and, at the same time, the language has a poetic and metaphoric feature, the function of the language cannot be representing reality and reality is never accessible for us in a naked form and as it exists independent from the language and the descriptions. Thus, in Rorty's view, the reality existent and accessible for us is a lingual reality constructed linguistically in cooperation with others in a community. Of course, it is clear that Rorty's intention of saying that 'the reality is constructed by the language' does never mean that we construct the reality arbitrarily in whatever form we want. Rather, we are responding to the external stimuli, a response from the type of various sentences that show themselves in the form of lingual reactions. Thus, without negating the external world independent of the language, Rorty denies the possibility of speaking of it and its immediate presence for us.

In the first place, it seems that belief in the lingual structure of reality places us in a better situation for defending concepts with new and proper definitions for resolving our daily issues. Among these concepts – that can be said to form, in a sense, the main body of the structure of the contemporary thought – are the concepts of freedom, agency, ownership, self-consciousness, thought and, perhaps more importantly, genuine life. These concepts are intermingled in the contemporary world in a way that perfect and precise understanding of each of them depends on a widespread and all-out perception of other concepts and, in principle, the real understanding of them is possible in relation and in proportion to one another.

The belief that the reality with which the human faces is constructed by human himself through the lingual medium with its instrumental feature, and is – consequently – quite fluid and historical, has displaced the realm of human activity and extended it to the extent

that has brought even the reality under the dominance of collective will. This is a will quite historical and fluid and, in its turn, has led to the historicity and fluidity of reality.

I believe such a construction by the human being is certainly free, for the human attributes it to himself and this attribution is meaningful just when the human regards himself as responsible for it and, thus, finds himself free in doing or leaving it. And basically, the mere acceptance of responsibility for an action shows the individual's freedom (his will) in doing it and, consequently, is a basis for the claim that he has informed activity. Indeed, the free activity, which is certainly along with consciousness, is the foundation for attributing an activity to the individual. On the one hand, and most importantly, accepting responsibility and attributing it to oneself is a turning point in self-consciousness. That is, going beyond consciousness as the common point between the human and the animal to self-consciousness depends on this attribution and thus free activity. Indeed, in such an attribution, 'I' or 'self' comes to the existence and makes the attribution possible. In short, 'I' or 'self' and, better said, self-consciousness has its roots in free activity on which Rorty emphasizes with emphasis on language.

With the above explanation in mind, the relationship between the concepts of ownership and free activity is also understandable. Clearly, the real owner of reality and event is the free and self-conscious agent who has, due to this agency, the possibility of attributing that action to himself. Perhaps, it is due to this fact that in the religious tradition, we see that God as the cause and creator of the possible beings is their real owner. Even one can show that some of the divine Names, apart from the Name *Mālik* (meaning 'the owner') are rooted in the fact that the creator of something is its real owner – Names such as *rabb* (lord), *mudabbir* (administrator), etc.

Regarding thinking and reflection, we must say that the essence of thinking is, in principle, linked with creativity and dynamism. Thought cannot be imitated, nor can it be acquired. Thought must be produced and constructed; thus, just a free and self-conscious agent has the opportunity to be in the situation of thinking and contemplation.

This can be shown by comparing the humans and the robots or computer more easily. We must see why the artificial intelligence, with its ever-increasing advancements and complexities, has not managed to be the owner of thought or possess 'I'. I think the answer to such questions is, finally, that these human artifacts have no agency or free will, and until such a being has no activity and cannot create something, it cannot be the owner of thought and, certainly, of itself.

The concept of genuine life, which is – in a more serious and more widespread sense – the concept of the contemporary world, and has attracted the attention of theoreticians of various intellectual and cultural spheres, mostly denotes a conflict with alienation. Now, it is about to become a dominant discourse in the international culture and even in the moral and legal relationships with phrases such as 'be yourself' or 'live yourself' and the like. 'Genuine life' is, indeed, a life that the individual has brought it under his ownership and is its real owner. Thus, we see how free activity and ownership are emphasized here as well. This is because without construction and creation, ownership and 'self' do not have any meaning. In fact, without free activity and creativity, there is no self and no self-consciousness, not any ownership of something (such as life, thought, etc.). Even emphasis on democracy has its roots in the same free agency, hence in ownership and self-governance.

Therefore, we see that some of the most important concepts of the contemporary lifeworld, which are in a meaningful relationship to

one another, are defensible and explainable by stressing on Rorty's language-constructed reality. However, and despite such a privileged position of this view in the contemporary discourse, Rorty's stress on solidarity instead of objectivity and truth necessitates priority and dominance of the sphere of culture over rational sciences, hence over relativism – the dominance that is proportional to the spirit governing over Rorty's anti-rational, anti-foundational and anti-naturalist approaches.

In fact, Rorty is in conflict with essential affairs, whether in the sense of fixed and eternal affairs or as affairs we see their fluidity and historicity as the result of unity of form and content and dialectic among them. Consequently, it seems that Rorty relies on instrumental, metaphoric and poetic view of language and the possibility of going beyond it and is leaning towards some principality of will (including both individual and social), based on which philosophy turns into an *a posteriori* affair dependent on will. Indeed, Rorty makes reality dependent on the subject and, on the one hand, broadens the territory of 'will' and makes it freer and, on the other hand, denies the *a priori* and necessary affairs (whether transcendental or non-transcendental), while preserving the reality itself. He tries, by supposing the existence of reality itself, to save us from being completely without criterion and without reliance. But it is not clear how such an inaccessible reality (reality *itself*) can afford this task. Besides, basically, the necessity of supposing such a reality is doubted and, thus, one can say that we are logically faced with a mental idealism completely based on will and completely relativist.

The final point is that emphasis on searching for solidarity instead of truth and substantial and rational affairs and, in a sense, eliminative encounter with the issue, while being a metaphysical fact,

seems to be an answer based on ‘will’ rather than an answer based on ‘thought’. Thus, it cannot be the solution. I believe that the real solution for the issue shows itself in understanding the superior position encompassing both parties. And Rorty’s answer makes us face with some more serious issues regarding the political, legal and social system. This is what requires separate investigation and attention, and we suggest its investigation to those interested in it.

Conclusion

According to the study conducted here, we can conclude that Richard Rorty, influenced by his Darwinian approach, considers ‘reality’ something lingual and constructed by the language, innovated by us as human beings in cooperation with one another and in proportion to our historical-cultural situation as well as our needs. Of course, in saying ‘the reality is constructed by the language’, Rorty does never mean that we construct the reality arbitrarily and in whatever way we wish. Rather, what occurs in practice is that we are responding to the external stimuli, a response of the type of various sentences that show themselves in the form of lingual reactions. Besides, it is known that the reason for Rorty’s offering such a view and defending it is the features he regards for the language. Rorty enumerates some features for the language, and we can consider his view of reality as the product of such an attitude. Firstly, he considers the language as an instrument like other instruments and, thus, considers it without a fixed nature and identity. Secondly, he believes that it is not possible to go beyond the language and, thus, the limits of our world are the same as the limits of our language and vice versa. Thirdly, the language has a metaphoric, poetic and contingent feature. Considering the fact that it is not possible to go out of the language and, on the one

hand, considering the poetic and metaphoric feature of the language, the function of language cannot be – in principle – representing reality; and reality is never accessible for us in a naked form and as independent of language and descriptions. Therefore, in Rorty's view, the reality existent and available for us is a lingual reality constructed by the language in cooperation with others in a community.

Evaluation of Rorty's view showed that belief in the lingual construction of reality places us in a better situation for defending concepts such as activity, freedom, self-consciousness, ownership, thought and genuine life that we can say, in a sense, form the main body of the structure of the contemporary thought. These concepts are so intermingled that the precise and complete understanding of each depends on a broad and comprehensive understanding of other concepts. And, in principle, the real understanding of them is possible in relation and in proportion to one another. Nevertheless, Rorty's emphasis on solidarity instead of objectivity and truth necessitates a type of priority and dominance of the sphere of culture over the rational sciences, the dominance that is in proportion to spirit governing Rorty's anti-rationalism, anti-foundationalism and anti-naturalist approaches. As a result, it seems that Rorty – by relying on the instrumental, metaphoric and poetic view of language, and impossibility of going beyond it – is leaning towards a type of principality of 'will' (including both individual and social) based on which the philosophy is an *a posteriori* and will-based affair. Emphasizing the search for solidarity instead of truth and substantial and rational affairs and – in a sense – the eliminative encounter with the issue, while itself a metaphysical fact, is an answer based on 'will' instead of an answer based on thought, hence unable to be a solution to the problem. I believe that the real solution to the problem shows

itself in understanding the superior position encompassing both parties. And Rorty's answer makes us face with some more serious issues regarding the political, legal and social system. This is what requires separate investigation and attention, and we suggest its investigation to those interested in it.

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