Immortality in the Arristotelian Christian tradition

Document Type : Original Article

Author

10.22081/jti.2022.61067.1015

Abstract

Immortality in Christian Aristotelism and Thomism is not endless continuity in time after death, but assimilation and participation in God’s eternity. Life of the Saved does not undergo any changes per se, since there is no passage of time in eternity. For Aquinas the subjects of immortality are, on the one hand, the resurrected human beings and, on the other, the subsistent souls which should not be confused with substances proper. Personal identity and thus the identity of the resurrected body are guaranteed by the soul as forma substantialis individualis. In Aristotelian hylemorphism ـ presupposed by the two theses – the materia, however, is not matter in the modern sense, but rather potentiality. Immortality in Christian Aristotelism and Thomism is not endless continuity in time after death, but assimilation and participation in God’s eternity. Life of the Saved does not undergo any changes per se, since there is no passage of time in eternity. For Aquinas the subjects of immortality are, on the one hand, the resurrected human beings and, on the other, the subsistent souls which should not be confused with substances proper. Personal identity and thus the identity of the resurrected body are guaranteed by the soul as forma substantialis individualis. In Aristotelian hylemorphism ـ presupposed by the two theses – the materia, however, is not matter in the modern sense, but rather potentiality.

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